Long Live the AKP

Both the news and Facebook newsfeeds have been full of commentary on the Turkish protests this week. But for those who live under a rock, events have run something like this:

After riot police tear-gassed a small group of people in Istanbul protesting against Gezi Park being bulldozed for redevelopment as a shopping mall, thousands of people marched into nearby Taksim Square in anger at the brutality. The demonstrations spread to other cities within a few days, and now unions are calling a two-day general strike. For his part, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, insists that he will not compromise the original plans to redevelop the park nor listen substantially to the protesters. The political angle to the protests is explicit, with calls for the PM and the government to resign, reflecting the polarised nature of Turkish society. Although the Gezi park issue galvanised traditionalists and conservatives, the public anger has emanated mainly from the 30-40% of Turkey that has long loathed Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP): the left, secularists, Kemalist-nationalists and the youth of the major cities. They have many grievances (see this article, for example), many of which are perfectly valid.

Yet what the Facebook warriors have missed in their righteous fury is this: the problem is not Erdogan's government but the shambles that is the parliamentary opposition.

That is not to say that the government is right in destroying an historic park without proper consultation, or condoning police brutality. But would any of this have happened had the AKP not been the only serious party in Turkey for the last decade? If there had been a pragmatic opposition party, or coalition of parties, that offered a positive alternative vision for Turkey? Arguably not. If there had been such an opposition, Erodogan and the AKP would have been held to account far more effectively. The people protesting on the street, trying to remove a democratically elected government via mass sit-ins and striking, would have had an outlet to channel their dissatisfaction. Crackdowns on Erdogan's enemies would not have been anywhere near as authoritarian or total. Indeed, the AKP has been a victim of its own success. Had they not had the power to systematically destroy their enemies (in the army, the media, the courts) there would not be an undercurrent of anger that threatened to boot them out of office. Instead, the main opposition parties - the centre-left CHP and the nationalist MHP - have been weak, reactionary and totally ineffectual. They tried to shut down the AKP via the courts, opposed reaching out to the Kurdish population and rejected the policies that have trebled Turkey's GDP/capita. Small wonder that protesters actively dissociate from them.

So kicking out the government would do absolutely nothing to help Turkey, contra to the beliefs of indignant citizens, although it would probably succeed in sparking capital flight. The problems are real but protesters are focusing on the wrong target. A proper parliamentary opposition is the only way that any of their concerns will ever get addressed, because if Erdogan et al. don't face a challenge at the ballot box they have no incentive to listen. Until such an opposition emerges, long live the AKP.

The Eastern Question

In the dying days of the Ottoman Empire, the 'Eastern Question' was a hot topic among Western powers. Now, over the last 18 months or so, Turkey has again been garnering a lot of international attention, beginning with Prime Minister Erdogan (pictured, with David Cameron) walking out of the Davos forum last year in protest at Israel's Gaza operations, through to voting against sanctions on Iran in a recent UN Security Council meeting. Actions such as these, together with increasingly close ties with Russia and China, have led to the perception that Turkey is 'looking eastwards' after decades (or indeed centuries) of Westernisation. For many this appears to be a cause for concern, a symbol of the decline of Western economies and a country turning away from those that were previously its allies (most obviously Israel). There also appears to be a perception prevalent in the media that Turkey's government is turning the country away from liberal values and instead paving the way to Islamisation (One of the more extreme articles can be seen at
http://www.spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/6171324/weep-for-britain-1940-this-is-not.thtml).

However, those somewhat acquainted with Turkish current affairs can draw different conclusions, which point to a far more optimistic picture.

The charge of an illiberal and Islamist government agenda is somewhat ludicrous. The so-called 'evidence' for backing up such doom-mongering appears chiefly to be that the current government is made up of moderate Muslims, and that there was an attempt a couple of years ago to allow headscarves to be worn in public institutions which resulted in a backlash. When properly looked at rather than screamed hysterically, however, these points seem to support the idea of the progression of liberal democracy in Turkey, not the reverse. Take a look at the government. The ruling AK Party was elected in 2003 on a mandate to improve the economy and begin EU accession talks. It has delivered on both these fronts, opening EU talks in 2005 and bringing in a string of economic reforms. As a result, Turkey has seen a phenomenal turnaround in its economy, with FDI increasing exponentially, hyperinflation tamed in a couple of years and GDP per capita increasing nearly tenfold over 10 years. Yet the government has not only tackled economic problems, but has been the first since the inception of the Republic to seriously tackle democratic issues. Amongst other changes, it has set a date for a referendum on a raft of proposed changes to the country's constitution, drawn up after a 1980 coup by the army (which, it transpires, engineered the anarchy which provided the pretext for a takeover). All this by the same government that is apparently made up of 'Islamic extremists'. A supposed example of the 'covert Islamism' charge levelled at the AK government was the attempt to remove restrictions on wearing headscarves in public workplaces such as universities, which led to an uproar amongst 'secularists' who perceived it as an assault on the Republic's values. In fact, the ban was only introduced in 1997 after pressure from the country's army, and its removal represents a step towards the tolerant attitudes Turkey's detractors say it lacks. The AK Party has to be given credit for turning a developing country into a G20 member and working to enhance Turkish democracy.

Very well, say some: Turkey has improved massively at home, but what about its foreign policy? It has courted Iran whilst aggravating Israel, they say; surely that's proof of a negative 'eastwards' shift in outlook? Again, one must look at this objectively. Turkey voted against further sanctions on Iran because it believed they would serve no good purpose. Sanctions cannot stop the possession of nuclear weapons by a regime bent on acquiring them; if anything, they will serve as an incentive to increase efforts to get hold of them. Far better to try and integrate Iran into the international community, especially as the country shares a border with Turkey. The anti-Israel sentiment displayed recently can be attributed to several factors. The first is the shooting of 9 Turkish citizens on board an aid ship bound for Gaza; the second is the perceived obstruction of the Israeli government in achieving an Israel-Palestine settlement, which agitates Turkey's neighbours such as Syria; and the third is a feeling of responsibility towards those in Gaza, partly for historical reasons. Most importantly, neither the current friendliness towards Iran nor the antipathy towards Israel is likely to become a permanent state of affairs, as it would not be in Turkey's interest to make it so.

So what are Turkey's interests? Given the country's economic resurgence, there is a clear incentive to become a strong regional player to boost trade with neighbours in both the Near East and Eastern Europe - dubbed by some in the Turkish media as 'neo-Ottomanism'. Yet it is also in the EU's interest to have a strong Turkey in these regions, to act as mediator between the West and the East, and to defuse tensions wherever possible. Already Turkey acts as mediator between Iran and America, and Israel and Palestine. Recently, Turkish money and diplomacy has been flowing into the Balkans, an area controlled by the Ottomans for 400 years which saw damaging fighting after their retreat in the late-19th and early-20th century. Indeed, some of the worst and most lasting conflicts of the 20th century can be traced to the lack of a strong Turkey to deal with problems - the Balkans and the Israeli-Palestinian struggles the most prominent. After many frustrated years spent pursuing EU membership, it is not surprising (and not a bad thing) that Turkey has begun concentrating on shoring up its regional base and restoring historical ties with former occupied countries. It is an approach that benefits all sides, and one that Britain, with its Commonwealth links and shared history and democracy with former 'Dominions', could learn from.

Looked at objectively, therefore, it's no exaggeration to say that Turkey has not been in such a good position for 400 years. Back in the days of the Ottoman Empire, campaigns were begun with the planting of a standard of horsetails in the battlefield. Today, the Empire has become a Republic and the battlefield has been replaced with the trading region. For the first time since the Ottoman days, however, the horsetails are in the East; Turkey is once more ascendant; and as such the West should be focussing on greeting it as a rising power and an ally, not lecturing.